In recent years, researchers have made tremendous progress to address an important question of how to provide security and privacy in Internet of Things systems. Privacy protection refers to safeguarding leakage of private information of the customers. In the context of Smart Grid, majority of the studies are based on addressing consumer side privacy. A recent research work has revealed that consumer side network has evolved into prosumer side network. Prosumer refers to consumer and producer, which means a dual role of a customer in the smart grid network. In this paper, we attempt to address the security and privacy issues at the prosumer side of smart grid network. Our work is different from the previous works in two ways. The paper proposes a lightweight encryption based privacy preservation scheme; Lightweight R-LWE-based Secure and PrivacyPreserving Scheme for Prosumer side network (LRSPPP). In LRSPPP, a new messaging scheme is defined which effectively minimizes the number of messages thus making it lightweight. Furthermore, the proposed privacy preservation scheme is using Learning With Errors over Rings (R-LWE) lattice cryptography. There is no previous evidence of use of R-LWE based encryption for prosumer's privacy protection in smart grid. The security and performance analysis shows that the LRSPPP is superior compared to three other existing schemes.
Introduction
Security and Privacy preservation are two important research challenges in Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Customers' private information is seamlessly collected for further analytics. Smart Grid (SG) is one of the IoT applications, where customers' electricity consumption information is used for balancing production and consumption of the electricity. Nowadays, role of consumers is twofold. Consumers of electricity excels as consumers and producers which are referred as prosumers. Rathnayaka et al. (2014) introduced goal oriented Prosumer Community Groups
Related work
The design of security and privacy preservation schemes for SG have attracted many researchers in the recent years. In this section, the security and privacy preservation schemes are classified based on the cryptography methods employed.
First category of research work exploits homomorphic encryption algorithms where operation done on cipher text results in same operation on plain text without handling actual information. Homomorphic encryption can be further categorized as partial homomorphic encryption (PHE) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) . Partial homomorphic encryption includes Paillier cryptosystem Paillier (1999) and ElGamal cryptosystem ElGamal (1985) based solutions. Fully homomorphic encryption scheme exhibits both additive and multiplicative homomorphism. Zhu et al. (2015) introduced an efficient privacy-preserving multidimensional aggregation scheme called PAS. The scheme is compared with an efficient and privacypreserving aggregation scheme EPPA Lu et al. (2012) and shows marginally better performance. The disadvantage of the scheme is it defines more computation overhead at smart meter (SM) level which is practically not suitable as the computation capacity of SM is less. In the work presented in 2017, Guan and Si (2017) considered that SG has big data related to all SMs as large number of SMs are joining to SG.
Privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme is invented for secret sharing and fault tolerance. Data aggregation is done using secret sharing scheme. The work considers that after every 15 minutes SM collects the data at its end, encrypt it and send to aggregator. It introduces large number of packets in the network which increases the communication overhead. Operation on cipher text at aggregator node defines more computation overhead compared to the operation on plain text. Busom et al. (2016) suggested a homomorphic encryption solution based on Elgamal encryption.
The proposal is secure against a coalition composed of a misbehaving substation and some corrupted meters. Electricity consumption data from n SMs is aggregated to break the link between SM and its respective consumption data. Thus, even the substation gets compromised by attacker, the individual SM data is protected. Rahman et al. (2017) proposed a private and secure bidding protocol for incentive based demand-response systems using Elgamal Encryption and Schnorr Signature scheme.
Various stages are introduced in the protocol which covers pre-processing stage, bidder registration, bidding key generation, bidding setup, bidding, bid verification, winner announcement, and incentive claim. The work is innovation but not lightweight. Also, comparison is not provided with other scheme. An incremental data aggregation scheme is presented by Hur et al. (2015) . It utilizes symmetric homomorphic encryption to secure data in-between nodes. It exploits bilinear Pairings and Identity-based Sequential Aggregate Signature. SMs aggregates the energy utilization data without knowing any intermediate of final result. The scheme is facing scalability issue and require more computations if SG contains large number of SMs. Tonyali et al. (2015) presented Smart-Vercauteren Scheme Perl et al. (2011) based FHE for preserving customer's privacy in SG network. The scheme is simulated in Network Simulator (NS3) for 802.11s-based mesh net-work. Compared to PHE, FHE introduces more data size and delay. The work is further extended for TCP protocol and presented the solution for packet reassembly for TCP during data aggregation process Tonyali et al. (2016) . Tonyali et al. (2018) employed FHE with multiparty computation (MPC) where SM's data is concealed by encrypting it using FHE or computing its shares on randomly polynomial with MPC. The aggregated data/computed shares are aggregated by aggregator SMs in hierarchical fashion till the data reached to gateway node. The proposed protocol reduces the overhead of FHE and performance is near to Paillier cryptosystem. Zhao et al. (2014) used FHE for cloud computing security solution. Bos et al. (2017) work concentrated on forecasting of electricity requirement of customers. Authors proved that Ivakhnenko's group method of data handling is suitable for homomorphic computations and is better than neural network based forecasting approach.
The limitation of homomorphic schemes is they do not provide verifiable computing.
Smart meters send the data to aggregator node and let aggregator node compute some operation on cipher text. Smart meter cannot verify that aggregator has done correct computation. To get this sort of guarantee, other solution is needed. Performance of homomorphic is another disadvantage. Cipher text in the ciphers are much larger than plain texts, and thus communication requirements typically go up. The computations on these large cipher texts are typically slower than the computations performed on plain text.
Second category covers solutions which are based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Hankerson and MenezesStein (2011) . As the part of initial work, ECC is used for authentication and key generation purpose. Zhang et al. (2013) defined an authentication and key agreement scheme for mutual authentication between substations and smart appliances. Internal attacker resistant data aggregation scheme is presented by He et al. (2017) . ECC approach is used in this scheme for better performance and provably secure aggregation scheme. Sun and Song (2017) provided a simplified approach using Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) and ECC. A trusted third party defines the parameter for ECC and initially a password is shared be-tween Community Energy Management System (CEMS) and SM as the part of initialization phase. A session key is generated between CEMS and SM. In authentication phase, CEMS and SM authenticate with each other using ECC approach. Aggregated data is encrypted using session key. The trusted party saves hash of ID of each SM and whenever SM wants to communicate with TA, SM communicates through IDs hash. The limitation here is; authors has not described about the properties of hash function. It may possible that hash of two different IDs can be same, in that case whether the TA can properly authenticate the SM. Secondly, no performance evaluation is described in the work. Vahedi et al. (2017) invented a solution for data aggregation which is based on ECC and Elgamal cryptography. The research work presented an Elliptic Curve Based Data Aggregation (ECBDA) scheme to preserve the privacy of smart meter.
Majority of above protocols are based on integer factorization or discrete logarithm problem. Shor (1994) proposed algorithm to solve integer factorization problem in polynomial time. Also solution Proos and Zalka (2003) is given for elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. This clearly indicates the need for mathematically stronger public-key cryptography. Lattices and coding based cryptography are solutions for the future.
Third category is based on Lattice Cryptography Ajtai (1996) . Li et al. (2015) used R-LWE based homomorphic approach for providing support to dual-functional (mean and variance) aggregation and invented a privacy-preserving dualfunctional aggregation scheme (PDA). SMs present at residential users reports consumption data based on which statistical values (mean and variance) can be calculated. PDA is secured against IND-CPA attack and also robust. It shows better performance compared to Paillier based aggregation scheme. Abdallah and Shen (2017) presented a work for providing privacy to customers' information. In this scheme, the time of day is divided into three slots and each HAN can send maximum one message in this slot. Thus number of messages in a day vary from zero to three. It is based on forecasting the future electricity demand. For providing the security, the scheme uses N-th degree truncated polynomial ring (NTRU) cryptosystem Hoffstein et al. (1998) which includes NTRU based encryption scheme and NTRU based signature scheme. The scheme provides privacy and at the same time satisfies the security requirements. In another research work, Abdallah and Shen (2016) presented lattice based homomorphic scheme.
Our work is motivated by the need to protect the SG network against future quantum attacks. In our previous work Agarkar and Agrawal (2016) , we presented the lightweight privacy preserving scheme using R-LWE lattice cryptography. The scheme was developed for consumer side network of SG. The scheme showed better performance compared to RSA 512 based traditional periodic pattern scheme in terms of computation and communication overhead. It is efficient in terms of computation overhead compared to Abdallah and Shen (2014) . In this paper, we presented the security and privacy for prosumer network in SG. Compared to previous research, our work is different in two aspects. The proposed scheme provides new messaging scheme for prosumer network where consumers are able to generate electricity and interested to sell the generated energy to either the electricity grid or other consumers. The scheme limits number of messages in the network which not only reduces the communication overhead of the network but also helps to secure the network against DoS attack. The scheme also guarantees privacy of prosumer's information. The scheme uses R-LWE based encryption scheme for encrypting the messages between the communicating parties and also uses R-LWE based signature for verification of the messages. R-LWE reduces the space requirement as each sample from R-LWE distribution can replace n samples from standard LWE distribution; which reduces the secret key size and public key size by factor of n. It provides security against probable attacks in the network such as replay attack, DoS attack, MITM attack and also shows better performance in terms of computation and communication overhead.
Background
Lattice cryptography suggests cryptographic algorithms based on lattices. Such algorithms are used to build cryptographic protocols which involves routines like encryption functions, digital signature schemes and one-way hash functions. Roots of lattice cryptography can be traced to benchmark work presented by Ajtai in Ajtai and Dwork (1997, 2007) followed by several similar attempts presented in Regev A lattice is set of points in hi-dimensional space and arranged in periodic manner. It can be represented as L ¼ fa 1 :v 1 þ a 2 :v 2 þ ::::: þ a n :v n ja i is integerg for linearly independent vectors v 1 ; v 2 ; :::; v n in the real vector space R n . Consider the lattice a˛Z nÂm q , which is n Â m matrix (where n is small and m is large and all entries are over finite field Z q ) and s is secret matrix as, s˛Z n q , we can compute b ¼ a:s. Given ða; bÞ it is hard to find s. This hardness is used in lattice cryptography.
Learning with error (LWE)
Hardness of lattice cryptography can be increased by introducing error values in the equation. Thus, given ða;a:s þ eÞ, find where a is the lattice, s is the secret vector and e is the error vector whose entries are chosen from distribution function. LWE introduces new mathematical problems such as N-th degree truncated polynomial ring (NTRU) and Learning with errors over rings (R-LWE).
NTRU
NTRU is based on the algebraic structures of polynomial ring R ¼ Z½x=ðx n À 1Þ.
Related operations are convolution multiplications and all polynomial in ring have integer coefficients where degree is at most n À 1. NTRU cryptosytem can be defined using three parameters ðn; p; qÞ where n is prime, q is always larger than p, and p and q are coprime; and four sets of polynomials L f ; L g ; L m and L r which are a polynomial part of private key, a polynomial for generation of the public key, the message and a blinding value respectively, all of degree n À 1.
Ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings (R-LWE)
R-LWE distribution is pseudorandom. Here are basic elements for R-LWE. fðxÞ ¼ x n þ 1˛Z½x , and n is a power of 2, which makes fðxÞ irreducible over the rational.
R ¼ Z½x= < fðxÞ > be the ring of integer polynomials modulo fðxÞ. q ¼ 1 mod 2n
be a large public prime modulus (bounded by a polynomial in n). Let R q ¼ R= < q > ¼ Z q ½x= < fðxÞ > is the ring of integer polynomials modulo both fðxÞ and q. q n elements of R q and can be represented by polynomials of degree less than n. Its coefficients are from 0; ::::::; q À 1.
R-LWE cryptosystem
LRSPPP uses R-LWE cryptosystem from Lyubashevsky et al. (2013) for providing security. Advantages of R-LWE can be listed as, 1. Each noisy product b ¼ a:s gives n pseudo-random values over Z q , rather than just one scalar, yet the cost of generating is very small.
2. Polynomial multiplications required for the calculation can be done in Oðn lognÞ time. Additionally, by employing Fast Fourier Transform the same can be done using in Oðlog nÞ with highly optimized way.
3. Each sample ða; bÞ˛R q ÃR q from R-LWE distribution can replace n samples ða; bÞ˛R q ÃR q from the standard LWE distribution which reduces the secret key size as well as public key size by factor of n.
R-LWE cryptographic scheme (Key generation, encryption, decryption)
Initially fix a ring R ¼ Z½x= < x n þ 1 > where n is power of 2. The cryptography scheme includes following steps:
1. Key generation: A uniformly random element a˛R q is chosen. Two random 'small' elements s; e˛R are chosen where s works as private key and e works as error value. Using s and e, parameter b is calculated as,
The key pair ða; b ¼ a:s þ eÞ˛R 2 q . The key pair ða; bÞ works as the public key.
2. Encryption ða; q; m˛0; 1 n Þ : To encrypt an n-bit message m˛0; 1 n , which is an element of R by considering its bits as the 0e1 coefficients of a polynomial, 3 random elements r; e 1 ; e 2˛R are chosen from the error distribution Ds and finds the pair ðu; vÞ˛R For an appropriate choices of parameters, r:e À s:e 1 þ e 2˛R have magnitude less than q=4, and hence bits of m can be recovered by rounding each coefficient of v À u:s to 0 or q=2, whichever is closest modulo q.
R-LWE based signature scheme (Key generation, sign, verify)
We employ the digital signature scheme introduced by Wu et al. (2012) .
The scheme includes following steps:
1. Key Generation ( 1 n ): A ring element is chosen a˛R q with a prime number t˛Z * q . Select s; e˛Ds where s works as the secret key and e is the error value. Based on this, parameter b is computed as,
The pair ða; bÞ works as the public key.
2. Sign ( ðm; sÞ; HðmÞ): H is the collision resistant hash function H : f0; 1g Ã / R q , m is the message and s is the secret key. To sign a message, select v˛R q from uniform distribution over R q . Choose e 1˛D s and compute
Return the signature ( ðv; uÞ on m).
3. Verify ( ða;bÞ; HðmÞ; ðv;uÞ): Based on the public key ða;bÞ, the signed message ðm; ðv; uÞÞ and HðmÞ, verification of the message can be performed. To verify the message check whether ðv; uÞ˛R q Â R q and ½Àa:u þ b:v mod t ¼¼ Àb:HðmÞ mod t ð7Þ
If both the conditions get satisfied, then the message is verified. Otherwise the message is not a valid message.
Model
System model includes details of network model, adversary model and security requirements and also covers the security goals of the LRSPPP scheme. 
Network model

Adversary model and security requirements
Probable attacks in smart grid network are Denial of Service (DoS) attack, replay attack, Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and insider attack. An adversary refers to an attacker who can create range of attacks to the SG network. An adversary can be any node in the region of SG network. An adversary can introduce active and passive attacks. As part of a passive attack, adversary tries to listen to messages between different parties in the communication. In active attack, it can introduce replay attack or falsify intercepted messages. Additionally, the adversary may send number of messages to CG to introduce DoS attack. It may try to get electricity supply amount and benefit amount information for each prosumer. We consider all parties involved in communication are trustworthy and do not introduce any attack. In view of possible attacks, security model should provide the basic security requirements for the network such as confidentiality, message integrity, availability and provide privacy for consumers' data. Following are the details of security requirements.
Customer's privacy: Individual prosumer's electricity generation data should not be revealed to any party. Only PCC and respective CG must handle it.
Confidentiality and Messages Integrity: Individual prosumer's electricity generation and respective benefit amount information must be protected from the adversary. If an adversary tries to eavesdrop any message, it should not be able to find actual data present in the message. Secondly, when the adversary tries to introduce replay attack, it must be detected by respective party. Finally, data present at CG must be secured, so that even if the adversary tries to access prosumer's database, the information must not be available to it.
Availability: Adversary may introduce DoS attack to block access of CG. Thus, CG must be available to all parties, when required.
Security goals
Our proposed scheme achieves two major goals:
LRSPPP assures security for all parties involved in the communication. Prosumers' privacy is preserved at the same time proposed scheme achieves integrity and confidentiality of data. It also takes care about the availability of network resources during communication.
LRSPPP is efficient in terms of computation and communication over-head.
Methodology
LRSPPP consists of major two phases: Initialization phase and message exchange phase. Initialization phase is introduced for initial set up of keys between PCC, CGs and prosumers. CG informs to PCC about possible electricity supply from its PCG. Message exchange phase consists of dynamic messages required during lifetime of network such as supply change, price change and goal change. PCC computes monthly benefit share of all PCGs and inform to CGs. Further, CGs finds distribution of benefit amount among prosumers based on their performance. Fig. 2 shows messages related to initialization phase whereas Fig. 3 shows messages related to message exchange phase.
Phase I: Initialization phase
During initialization phase, public keys of PCC and CG are generated and shared with respective controllers. Other aim of this phase is to set the amount of electricity supply from PCG.
Public key generation:
Phase I is responsible for generation of (public key, private key) pairs for PCC and CGs. Network contains one PCC, m CGs and each CG has n prosumers under its cluster. Trusted Authority (TA) fixes a ring R q ¼ Z q ½x= < fðxÞ >, where fðxÞ ¼ x n þ 1˛Z½x , and n is a power of 2, which makes fðxÞ irreducible over the rational. R q is the ring of integer polynomials modulo both fðxÞ and q. q n elements of R q can be represented by polynomials of degree less than n. Its coefficients PCC collects Forecast CG value from each CG and now can determine how much energy it can supply to buyers such as individual customers, retailers or utility grid.
After initialization phase, defined amount of electricity is supplied by CG.
Phase II: Message exchange phase
Phase II is introduced for the dynamic mechanism for electricity supply as well as price change per unit. After the initialization phase, each PCG supplies the electricity to buyers. During execution, if any change occurs in terms of electricity supply amount, price per unit or goal defined by PCG, then this situation must be handled dynamically.
Supply change (Prosumer / CG):
If prosumer recognizes change in possible amount of electricity supply, it informs the modified supply amount to CG. The supply change value, SC, is encrypted using public key of CG along with verification value and sent to CG. After receiving mes- 
Benefit amount generation:
At the end of each month, PCC generates the benefit amount of each PCG and informs to respective CG. Benefit amount, B CG , is computed as, B CG ¼ Total number of electricity supply by PCG x Price per unit B CG value is sent to CG in encrypted format along with signature. Thus, CG has information about benefit amount of its PCG. The benefit message is signed by PCC's private key and encrypted using respective CG's public key.
At PCC: PCC hashes benefit value BCG with time stamp T 5 . It chooses X PCC˛Rq and e 1 from error distribution function and computes
PCC encrypts the value of B CG using public key of PCC. It chooses r; e 1 ; e 2˛R from error distribution Ds. This e 1 value is different from e 1 used for signing purpose.
Based on these random values, PCC computes u PCC ¼ a CG *r þ e 1 ðmod qÞ ð 29Þ 
If success in validation, PCC accepts B CG value.
CG compares the B CG received from PCC with its record. CG calculates the distribution of benefit amount among the prosumers under its cluster based on the rank value. CG has a record of amount of electricity supplied by each prosumer. It also evaluates long-term and short-term electricity sharing for each prosumer based on which it defines rank of each prosumer. Using rank and electricity share, it finds benefit amount of each prosumer and save in the database in encrypted form. For example, if i th prosumer has B i as benefit amount, then
The benefit of individual prosumer is not shared to anyone in the network. Only prosumer and respective CG has its record which provides privacy for individual prosumer's information.
Analysis
Analysis section analyses how prosumer's privacy get preserved and how LRSPPP satisfies security requirements of SG such as confidentiality and integrity, authenticity for different parties, resource availability and accountability. Here we assume that all parties involved in communication are honest and no insider attack takes place in the network.
LRSPPP is designed considering the future requirement of smart grid network and employs the lattice cryptography solution for providing security against classical and quantum computers. In LRSPPP, the messages are securely encrypted and signed using R-LWE based schemes. The R-LWE problems can be stated as a "search problem" and a "decision problem". Let a i ðxÞ be the set of random and known polynomials from Z q ½x=fðxÞ with coefficients from F q , e i ðxÞ be the set of small unknown polynomials relative to a bound b in the Ring Z q ½x=fðxÞ. sðxÞ When the polynomial fðxÞ is a cyclotomatic polynomial, the difficulty of solving search version of R-LWE problem is equivalent to solving shortest vector problem in an ideal lattice. Our scheme uses the Ring R q ¼ Z q ½x=fðxÞ , where fðxÞ ¼ x n þ 1˛Z½x , and n is a power of 2. The public and private keys are generated using this
Ring. An attacker may try to find private key for decrypting the messages. But finding private key problem is equivalent to solving shortest vector problem of lattice. Trying to find private key requires finding non-zero vector from R q Â R q field. The best known algorithm for solving this problem needs 2 U(n) operations and thus it is considered as NP-Hard problem. Hence an attacker is not able to find the information sent during communication and guarantees the integrity and confidentiality of messages. Only valid receivers can decrypt the messages which proves the authenticity of communicating parties. For verification of received messages, messages are signed with private keys of the sender. Receiver verifies the messages using public keys of the sender. The signing and verification also uses R-LWE which provide guarantee regarding integrity of the messages. Here is the discussion of how LRSPPP provides privacy to customer's information and satisfies requirements of SG.
1. Privacy preservation: Individual prosumer's electricity supply data should not be revealed to any party. CG record individual prosumer's information in an encrypted manner in its database. CG does not disclose individual prosumer's supply amount to preserve privacy. PCC and CG share aggregated information about electricity supply and benefit amount of complete PCG in secured way using R-LWE encryption and signature scheme. Prosumers also send supply change message in encrypted manner. Also, every message is signed and verified by respective controllers. Thus an intruder cannot inject any false message.
Average case hardness of R-LWE in terms of encryption and signature of messages provides a strong base for providing privacy for prosumer's information.
2. Confidentiality and integrity of messages: All messages in the scheme are encrypted using public key of respective controllers. Thus adversary is not able to recognize the data sent through the message, even if it listens to it. Adversary tries to impersonate a smart meter to compromise its messages, but it cannot get an ID of prosumer as the prosumer's ID is stored in a secured fashion. Thus impersonation attack is not possible. CG sends the price change message in plain text, but it also sends the signature with message. Thus, adversary can recognize what is the proposed price but it cannot inject any false price message, as it is signed by the private key of CG. Again adversary cannot introduce a replay attack, as the time stamp is sent along with messages and receiver checks the same. Messages between PCC and CG are hashed and then signed using respective public keys. Thus, the scheme provides confidentiality and integrity of the messages and pro-vides security against active and passive MITM attack, and also from replay attack.
3. Authenticity for Different Parties: PCC and CG are authenticated by their public keys. Therefore, messages encrypted by them are authenticated. Authentication of prosumer is done through its ID.
4. Availability of Resources: Adversary can try to introduce a DoS attack to make PCC or CG busy so that it cannot be available for honest message handling. In LRSPPP, numbers of message transfers are limited and validity of messages is checked. If PCC or CG recognizes more input messages, in a limited time, it can detect it and block the respective malicious party.
5. Accountability: PCC generates monthly benefit for PCG and informs to CG. CG can verify this amount based on its database entries. Additionally, CG defines benefit amount of individual prosumer. Householder of respective prosumer can verify the monthly benefit amount based on the number of electricity units supplied and price per unit, as both values are available at prosumer.
In previous schemes such as traditional periodic pattern scheme, Busom et al.'s scheme and ECBDA scheme, each smart meter periodically sends electricity consumption data which not only reduces the lifetime of the network but also increases the chance of an attacker to recognize the knowledge regarding the electricity consumption. LRSPP reduces number of messages in the network and increases the security and privacy of prosumers individual information. Individual prosumers data is not revealed to any party except the respective CG to provide the privacy preservation. CG communicates to PCC and informs the collective amount of electricity supply from its PCG. Thus, LRSPP provides privacy to prosumer's individual information, its behavior and privacy during communication.
Results & discussion
The aim of our scheme is to provide the security and at the same time it should be lightweight in terms of communication and computation overhead. Communication overhead is related to messaging required between various controllers present in the communication. Computation overhead is related to the time required for execution of number of operations present in the scheme. The performance of LRSPPP is compared with traditional periodic pattern scheme Abdallah and Shen (2017) , the scheme proposed by Busom et al. (2016) and Elliptic Curve Based Data Aggregation (ECBDA) scheme Vahedi et al. (2017) . Two scenarios are considered for experimentation. In first scenario, network contains one PCC, one CG and number of prosumers varies from 10 to 100. In initialization phase, two messages are broadcasted for sharing public keys; one from PCC and other from CG. Additionally, CG sends supply forecast message to PCC. In message exchange phase, 3 messages are sent for price change, goal change and benefit amount message. In the best case situation, supply change message is not introduced in the network whereas in worst case, all prosumers send 3 supply change messages per day. Thus, for worst case situation, number of supply change messages are calculated as 30 Â 3 Â Number of Prosumers. Fig. 4 shows monthly Communication overhead of LRSPPP is compared with traditional periodic pattern scheme Abdallah and Shen (2017) , Busom et al. (2016) scheme and ECBDA proposed by Vahedi et al. (2017) . Fig. 5 shows the messaging by all these schemes for a month. In the traditional periodic pattern scheme, each smart meter sends its electricity consumption information after either 30 minutes or an hour. Considering periodicity of one hour, number of message exchange is 810*Number of Smart Meters Abdallah and Shen (2017) . Busom et al. (2016) requires maximum message transfers in the network. Four message exchange takes place for each smart meter for each periodic event. Communication overhead of ECBDA and traditional scheme are comparable. In the graph, periodicity of one hour is considered for all these three scheme. Worst case scenario of LRSPPP is considered for finding number of message transfers. Even in worst case, the proposed scheme is lightweight compared to other three scheme.
In the second scenario, we considered a network which has one PCC, CGs varies from 1 to 10 where each CG has 10 prosumers under its cluster. Fig. 6 shows the message transfers in the network. As compared to Fig. 5 , there is small increase in number of messages for LRSPPP which are because of public key broadcast and supply forecast message from each CG.
2. Computation overhead: LRSPPP uses basic operations as R-LWE based encryption and decryption, R-LWE based signing and verification and hashing. Hashing of supply change message is done using SHA-256 which requires 0.0004 ms for finding hash of the message.
The execution time for key generation, encryption and decryption of P1 parameters require 0.38 ms, 0.4 ms and 0.1 ms respectively. For P2 parameter, execution time for key generation, encryption and decryption is 0.8 ms, 0.8 ms and 0.3 ms. For digital signature, key generation, signing and verification requires 0.4 ms, 0.36 ms and 0.57 ms considering P1 parameters. For P2 parameter, 0.9 ms require for key generation whereas signing and verification requires 0.86 ms and 1.4 ms respectively.
Analysis of LRSPPP is done for two scenarios. In the first scenario, network contains one PCC, one CG and number of prosumers varies from 10 to 100. Time is required for one supply forecast message. As part of message exchange phase, considering worst case situation, each prosumer sent 3 supply change messages per day. Price change and goal change are least frequent messages. During analysis one price change and one goal change message is considered. PCC informs benefit amount for CG by a single message. Thus total computation operations performed are 3
where n is the number of prosumers in the network. Fig. 7 shows computation overhead required for a month considering all parties in the network for R-LWE P1 and P2 parameters.
As part of second scenario, network contains one PCC and number of CGs varies from 1 to 10. Each CG has 10 prosumers in the PCG. Fig. 8 shows the computation overhead for this scenario. Little increase in computation time is recorded compared to Fig. 7 .
To compare the performance of LRSPPP scheme with other schemes, we have implemented the traditional periodic pattern scheme which uses RSA 512 Hoffstein et al. (1998), Busom et al. (2016) scheme and ECBDA scheme. Figs. 9 and 10 shows computation overhead of all these schemes for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively.
Traditional periodic pattern scheme employs RSA 512 for encryption, decryption, signing and verification. Encryption and decryption operations require 0.4 ms and 8.1 ms respectively. At the same time, signing and verification takes 9.43 ms and 0.54 ms respectively. Each smart meter sends reading after one hour, which requires all four operations. Thus computation overhead for a month is 810* n* (Te þ Td þ Ts þ Tv) considering n as number of prosumers in the network. Busom et al. (2016) uses Elgamal cryptosystem for encrypting and decrypting messages. As the number of message exchanges in this scheme are very large, it impacts on the total time for computation. ECBDA tried to reduce the computation time by using Elliptic Curve based Elgamal encryption scheme. 4.9 ms and 13.7 ms are required for encryption and decryption process respectively. ECBDA also exploits Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) short signature scheme for signing and verification which needs 0.11 seconds for execution. Compared to these three schemes, the computation time requirement for LRSPPP is significantly less considering scenario 1 and scenario 2.
Conclusion
To summarize, we studied security and privacy at the prosumer side of smart grid network. A detailed discussion is presented on various encryption based privacy preservation schemes including homomorphic encryption schemes, ECC based lightweight encryption schemes, and recent developments on lattice cryptography.
In this paper, R-LWE based encryption scheme is presented for privacy protection in the smart grid network. Detailed analysis is conducted and the paper concluded the superiority of LRSPPP in terms of reduced messaging overhead and computation overhead. Additionally, the proposed LRSPPP is secured against MITM and replay attacks while protecting the privacy of prosumers.
In future, our work can be extended in three directions. The proposed scheme can be extended to provide security against insider attacks. Community gateway node or prosumer community coordinator can be compromised, therefore anomaly detection under this distributed networking scenario can add further knowledge. Secondly, the proposed solution can be extended using blockchains. Smart grid network is basically a transactive energy system. Therefore, a blockchain based solution using lattice primitives can take the research work one step further. Finally, it would be interesting to test these lightweight schemes on other similar multi-layer communication networks such as Precision agriculture network, Smart Surveillance system etc.
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